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IN RE: L.A.W, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 24 (May 7, 2015)1
CRIMINAL LAW: JUVENILE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Summary
The Court determined, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as
well as Article 1, § 18 of the Nevada Constitution, a public school cannot condition a student’s
access to a free public education upon consent to random searches of his person and property.
Evidence gathered from random administrative searches must be suppressed in criminal
proceedings.
Background
Minor L.A.W. enrolled in Legacy High School (Legacy) in Las Vegas on a trial basis as a
“last chance” placement after a series of behavioral issues. His enrollment included a “Behavior
Contract”, which stipulated, among other things:
“7. I realize I am subject to random searches by the administration.”
Both L.A.W. and his father signed the Behavior Contract.
At a later date, Legacy school administration conducted a search of all trial enrollees.
Administration found $129 and some small bags of a “leafy green substance” in L.A.W.’s
backpack. Administration gave the substance to the school district police officers, which
determined the substance to be marijuana. Officers advised L.A.W. of his Miranda2 rights and
placed him under arrest.
The state charged L.A.W. with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. In
a special hearing, L.A.W. contested the admissibility of the evidence, specifically statements
made by school staff, the police officer, and the fruits of the search. The Hearing Master declined
to suppress the evidence based upon the consent to search via the Behavior Contract and found
him guilty of the charges. The district court upheld the Hearing Master’s findings.
Discussion
While schools are expected to act “in loco parentis” and administrations are “permit[ted]
a degree of authority that could not be exercised over free adults,”3 this authority has limits.
Students are not expected to “shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.”4 Here, as
the state had no reasonable cause, searching students without warrant and without suspicion of
criminal activity is unreasonable, absent the student’s express consent5.
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Courts of other jurisdictions have held that education, even higher education, cannot be
conditioned upon a student’s willingness to waive his Constitutional rights.6The Supreme Court
held in Vernonia, 7 , however, that a school may require higher scrutiny of students who
voluntarily engage in athletic or other extra-curricular activities.
The State argued L.A.W. knowingly and voluntarily signed the Behavior Contract,
agreeing to random searches, as a condition of enrollment at Legacy. The State further argued
L.A.W. had other educational options available to him if he did not want to sign the behavior
contract, and these alternatives should allow the administration to use Vernonia and Earls
standards.
The State conceded administrators had no “special need” to search L.A.W. at the time of
the search and the administrators were relying on L.A.W.’s consent. Further, the State failed to
show what “other” options were available to L.A.W. at the time of his enrollment at Legacy.
The State offered some possible alternatives, but could not give any certain answers. As there
was no evidence available to show educational alternatives, the Court could not rely on
suppositions of the State, and had to assume none were available.8
As no evidence was available showing L.A.W. had access to alternative public education,
this case does not meet the Vernonia and Earls standards. Rather, it must be measured by the
Robinson9 standards; L.A.W. should be treated as any other student seeking access to public
education.
The State urged the Court to follow the Oregon Appellate Court’s decision in State ex rel.
Juvenile Dep't v. Stephens,10 holding a juvenile with behavioral problems enrolling in a “last
chance” school could be required to submit to random searches as a condition of enrollment.
The Oregon court held these conditions were “in exchange for the desired benefit”, in this case,
public education. The Oregon Court held it analogous to X-ray screenings of belongings at a
courthouse or airport.
The Court did not believe the right to a public education could be treated so lightly. A
public education is the foundation of democracy and good citizenship. It is imperative that all
students, especially those “last chance” students, are shown that the authority figures they come
in contact with are fair, just, and trustworthy. There is no benefit from conditioning education on
a denial of Constitutional rights.
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Conclusion
Admitting evidence from the administrative search would violate L.A.W.’s Fourth
Amendment rights. The State failed to show either the consent to search was voluntary, or
L.A.W. had other educational options beyond Legacy and its Behavior Contract. The State
cannot reasonably condition a free public education on the waiver of Constitutional rights.
Therefore, the district court should have suppressed the statements and the fruits of the
administrative search.11 The Court reversed the ruling of the district court and ordered the district
court to proceed consistent with this opinion.
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